Study Guide for Week Thirteen: Art and Education

Greene, “Thinking of Things as if They Could be Otherwise...”:

This and the following article are lectures that Maxine gave at the Lincoln Center Institute. As for all the artistic allusions here to novels, plays, paintings, performance artists, etc, etc, if many of the references are obscure, you could see this as a vital reading/seeing list. The Bibliography to the book where these articles first appeared provides for a life-time of engaged reading.

1. In the opening paragraph there is a fine statement of possibility that comes when we fully engage certain works of art. What might happen? How does what might happen relate to Greene’s vision of freedom?   She speaks of "breakthroughs.. the upsurges of the unexpected we may experience at certain moments of engagement with works of art."  She speaks in the next paragraph about how such "shocks of awareness" can jolt us into waking up out of our torpor of boredom.  This in turn connects to freedom of the imagination that we discussed last week.

2. Note the passage from Camus about frittering away our time for living. What might you put as examples of living in this context?  Frittering on twittering?  The historically unprecedented timesink that is the Internet?  At least at card tables and cafes there is contact with other human beings.

3. Note too the movement from experience to reflection to action on p. 117, the second and third paragraphs. 

4. What are some of the revisioned purposes of education identified by Greene?  "to invent situations in which young people are enabled to freely make of themselves who or what they are, that they ... engage continually (yes, and knowledgeably) with works of art." (118)

5. What is meant by “open spaces”? How might you go about creating such a space? Has our class been an “open space” this semester?  "Spaces where people can appear as who they are and not *what* they are, spaces for action on the part of all those involved... Action, in contrast to behavior, means taking an initiative, embarking on a beginning, setting something in motion."  To be honest, I'm not sure this class *has* achieved this (admittedly, high) standard.  I don't know, for instance, that a student who believed that some divine power played some kind of role in the universe's creation would feel "free to appear as who she were" in the early weeks of the course. Yet surely a person holding such beliefs (likely, in a Jesuit school) cannot be compared to a person advocating Nazism (which was, rightly, held to have no place in the classroom).

6. Democracy=voting vs. democracy=communities-in-the-making: how does the latter phrase relate to the democratic ideal?  We've covered this ground before, I think, with Dewey and Summerhill.  If we look small, "democracy" at a systems level is a good bit more than once-every-four-years voting: the multiple frameworks defining and protecting individual rights, the bottoms-up and top-down processes by which legislation is created and modified, the seen and less-seen roles played by different actors within government, market, and opinion-shaping spheres; the (IMHO considerable) individual responsibilities that come along with the privilege of living in a (flawed, imperfect) democratic society.  To reduce all that to once-every-four-years voting is, on the one hand, flip; and, on the other, misses the critical imperative to work the "seeing small" systems perspective as well as the "seeing large" personal one.  It takes all kinds to effect a revolution: Greene's vision requires not only many personal transformations on the part of individual educators, one by one by one; but also substantial structural transformations, involving money, allocation of finite school hours, assessment tools and procedures, and more.  

7. What is the point of the extended analysis of the passage from Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov?  It has been a very long time.  I believe, though, that Ivan stands for the ethical atheist, struggling to make moral sense of the world without an image of God in apologia.  He doesn't believe in God, but if there *were* a God, Ivan would be very cranky indeed with Him, given the amount of unjustifiable suffering in the world. 


Greene, “Resistance to Mere Things...”:

8. As I read this lecture, the idea occurs to me that for Maxine, a work of art is relational (analogous to Noddings’ vision of care as relational), that the work consists of the aesthetic experience that is the synthesis between the image (or book, sound, etc, etc) and the perceiver. If this is so, what do we bring to the work that allows for such an experience, such an opening?
Well, everything, isn't it: the hopes, fears, joys and sorrows of our prior experiences; other aesthetic experiences that we connect back, Dewey-style, to the one we're experiencing; our background knowledge of the artistic domain itself; the quality (or not) of our attention.

9. Here too we find the idea that part of what we bring is “aesthetic education.” What does that include? Does such an education address the worries raised by Greene about imagination beginning at the bottom of p. 123: “I need to ponder...two issues having to do with imagination...”?  Right.  Well, sure.  The only way that kids will ever learn to love Shakespeare is to... experience Shakespeare.  The only way that kids learn to love museums is to... go to museums.  

Greene raises two issues -- she actually does not call them "worries," and I think only the first of them should, properly, rank as one.  The first is the observation that "imagination is not always benevolent" (she provides both Columbine and horror films as examples).  The second is the observation that Harry Potter and Star Wars have sparked far wider youth enthusiasm than, say, the Brothers Karamazov.  I don't think *she* argues that aesthetic education can "solve" the first issue; I think she *suggests* (does not come outright and say) that aesthetic educators might, possibly, draw on HP and SW as entry points to other versions of the classic heroic-quest storylines and mythical elements that they draw on.

10. What lessons does Greene extract from the Marge Piercy poem on p. 125?  Wake up!  Wake up, you people!

11. Think of all the ways in which “imagination can be corrupted” (p. 127).  I'm more persuaded by Morrison's Bluest Eye than by Dewey's Dead Facts.  The same mythical motifs that provide my aesthetic context and deepen my encounter with art might be someone else's Dead Facts. 

12. In response to the passage from Sartre, Maxine talks about helping “to free teachers and learners to find and use their own voices...”  Yes.

Study guide - week twelve - Freedom, Imagination and Community

Greene, “Seeking Contexts”:

1. You should be clear about what it means to see the world “small” versus seeing the world “large.” It will become clear later that for Greene these perspectives are a matter of both/and rather than an either/or.  According to Greene, seeing the world "large" means viewing people collectively as "small and at a distance" in a detached and systematic manner; seeing the world "small" means viewing individuals "big... (and)  in their particularity and integrity instead."  (p. 10)  While we may find synthesis in later readings, in *this week's* readings she is clearly favoring seeing "large."

 
2. It is interesting that Greene encourages us to think of what it would mean to educate young people so that they can handle “catastrophes” (p. 13); this was written long before 9/11. What might it mean to do that? What would you want students to learn?

My own focus would be to try and support the development of (Dewey-esque) habits such as metacognition, considering the situation from the position of the Other's shoes, "going up to the balcony" to gain perspective, conflict resolution skills, and physical stress reduction techniques such as deep breathing.  Some of this (the shoes of the Other, the balcony) I think overlaps with what Greene is trying to do; some of it takes a different tack.

3. What is meant by “authentic assessment”? What, by contrast, would be inauthentic?  Authentic seems to mean assessments that allow students to tell their own stories (Greene mentions portfolios and exhibitions; Elizabeth Langran-style digital stories and podcasts would also, I think, meet her definition).  Closed-end tests, particularly multiple choice, and *particularly particularly* closed end multiple choice tests defined outside the classroom and administered to very large populations, would not.  (p. 13)

4. What does it mean to be “onto something”? How does it connect with imagination? If imagination is important–as it certainly is from Greene’s perspective–what can we do to nurture this faculty; what is often done to squelch it?

I think imagination is typically coupled with acts of *creation*; Greene here is arguing that imagination is necessary to *see* properly, which is a quite different connection.  The surface-answer to the nurture/squelch question is something like "open ended child-led activities nurture/closed end rote memory based activities squelch."  I think she is actually "onto" something more fundamental that, while it certainly includes this sentiment as an offshoot, is on a somewhat different primary trajectory, about the nature of surprise and empathy in transforming the self.

5. Note the emphasis on “looking at things as if they could be otherwise,” a phrase repeated at least twice in the text, and part of the title of an article we will discuss next week. Why should we? What is being called for here?

Idealism, in all its forms, for better and worse, is predicated upon looking at things as if they could be otherwise.  It is the starting point for all change agents, and she certainly aspires to effecting change.


Greene, “Imagination, Community and the School”:

6. When we refer to students as “at risk” what are we typically saying? What should we be saying?  We are saying that they are at risk of failure.  What we should be saying... gets back, again, to what the point of education is supposed to be.  If the point of education is to ensure the development of a list of *skills* such as (most fundamentally) reading, then to identify a student as being "at risk" of failing to learn to read, in order to provide the services and supports required to mitigate that risk, then... it's OK.  Perhaps someone might come up with a better phrase, and that would be fine.  To not meet the real need, for discomfort about the language, would *not* be fine.  To disengage from the responsibility to teach students to read does not serve the students well.

If the point of education is mostly about self actualization and expression, then the phrase "at risk" reads quite differently.

7. What are the features of a democratic community? How can we educate young people to participate fully in such a community? Are students being so educated at Summerhill?  Interconnectedness and community (p. 33).  Summerhill students certainly get *some* of this, though their exemption from cooking, cleaning, maintenance and other basic chores detracts substantially from the mutual obligations and *work*, some of which inevitably is tedious, associated with real interconnectedness.  There's a sense in which Summerhill students experience the *pleasures* of community whilst paid employees take care of the *work*, which alters the thing.  

8. Note the reference to a “range of literacies” on p. 34. We will want to explore what it would mean to take this notion seriously.  These include the "habits of mind" that enable students to take initiatives in the learning process, to become active and critical learners, to tell their own stories, pose their own questions, be present... 

9. When Greene speaks of the “recovery of imagination,” what kind of imagination is she envisioning?  I think it comes back to this business of *seeing* properly as requiring powers of imagination -- of empathizing deeply with characters in literature, of connecting their situations and development with personal situations, of seeing in them potential to bring depth and power to the "recovery."

10. What is the connection between oppression (racism, sexism, etc.) and imagination? How will the recovery of imagination diminish the impulses that give rise to oppression and kindle the desires to end it?  Well.  I think the idea that people -- any of us -- can only relate to characters or depictions in art that reflect our own cultures or ethnic or religious affiliations is mighty limiting -- insulting, even.  I can't relate to Odysseus because he's an ancient white man?  If I were black, I couldn't relate to Tom Sawyer in Huck Finn?  That's a mighty tragic view of the *limitations* of imagination, and I don't really believe it's what Greene is arguing.  A great story *transcends.*  That's what makes it great.  That said, the "canon" is fairly criticized for its Dead White Maleness, and benefits from the inclusion of other perspectives, other dialects, other images.  The trick is to be honest about standards of excellence.  It may not be *fair* that women, for example, didn't often get to develop their gifts as mature artists during the Renaissance; or blacks during slavery: *but they didn't.*   You can't just toss second-rate work in among the Dante and Shakespeare just for the political correctness of it.  Or fall into the compensatory sin of too much modernism.

11. Note that ending oppression is seen as building community. This should be obvious, in one sense, but it is worth exploring. How does oppression disrupt community?  Greene draws a straight line between what she sees as the stigma caused by labeling, and silencing: "Far too seldom are such young people looked upon as beings capable of imagining, of choosing, and of acting from their own vantage points on perceived possibility."  Ending oppression allows these people to "wake up" and become fully alive, part of the interconnectedness of community, rather than mere recipients of benevolent services.

Remaining assignments

ED 429:
- X Greene Project Presentation ("be prepared" 4/21 and 4/28)
- X Greene Paper (due 4/25)
- X Re-reflection (due 4/28)
- Self-estimation (due 4/28)

SE 534:
- Beyong goals & objectives (due 4/29)
- X Group IEP on M. case study (due 4/29; share draft to group 4/15)
- Teacher interview (due 4/29)

SE 537:
- X Group lesson plan/Case Study Part II (due 4/15; draft of modifications for Susan by 4/9)
- X Course integration / Wink writeup (due 4/29)

ED 429 - Study Guide for Week Eleven

Dewey Chapter Five: “The Nature of Freedom”:

1. As you read Dewey’s discussion of freedom, think back to Summerhill and imagine where Neill would agree and where not. They approach the question with very different premises. Dewey starts out by asserting true freedom is internal: that "the only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence... and of judgment exercised on behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile. The commonest mistake made about freedom is.. to identify it with freedom of movement, or with the external or physical side of the activity." (p. 61) Freedom of movement (insofar as it does not impinge on the freedom of others) is precisely Summerhill's focus: end, not means. The only value judgment Neill is willing to make is to define actions that abridge the freedoms of others as "license." That is, indeed, a "thin" notion of freedom.

2. What values does “outward movement” (by which he means all kinds of unstructured physical activity, from talking to walking) serve? Why is it important? Well, as suggested above, it is a necessary means to the desired end of internal freedom of judgment and courage. A student can only discover what is "intrinsically worthwhile" if he can wander around and make comparisons. A teacher can only discover what impassions students by observing them wandering around, manifesting choices. (Also, it's good for the body. :o) ) But to Dewey, this type of physical freedom is not sufficient: it does not necessarily inculcate the habits that free the mind and heart.

3. What does Dewey mean by freedom as an end in itself? Is freedom, understood in this way, a value our culture truly embraces? Well, forgive me, but what *I* believe he means is: unfettered, but also unfocused and ultimately self-indulgent outward-focused freedom such as Summerhill's. Another take would be freedom to "shop until you drop," which is similarly unfettered and self-indulgent, though in a different dimension. Whichever interpretation you take, what Dewey is cautioning against, I believe rightly, is to equate "freedom" with "whim and caprice" (p. 65). The existence of a multitude of choices spread out before us does not, in and of itself, make us free.

Dewey takes the development of habits of self-control and delayed gratification very seriously, and *these*, I think, are values that are not currently very valued in our society.

4. “The ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control” (p. 64). What does he mean by this? Well, again, I expect that what we think he means depends largely on what other values we bring to our reading of him. While Dewey takes *process* very seriously, and believes that processes (physical freedom, student choice, democratic decisionmaking, etc) are necessary means, he looks at *outcomes* as well. Not all experiences are equally educative; he tries hard to define the value system by which experiences can and should be evaluated; and, very much to his credit, he is willing to acknowledge when outcomes are disappointing. In this he is fundamentally different from (what we've read of) Neill.

What I think he is saying about the value of, and need to educate for, the power of self-control is in essence more similar than different from what the modulating desert rabbis tried to articulate, or Confucius, or Jesus, or Buddha, or Muhammed. (The vocabulary is clearly different.)

5. Why is the impulsive person acting under the “illusion of freedom” (p. 65)? (“Do you mean when I shop ’til I drop I’m not being free?”) "Shop-to-the-drop" is certainly one example of possible illusions of freedom; but they really are countless, aren't they. The advent of the Pill has brought countless new pressures and innovative forms of oppression upon women, particularly young girls. The same can be said of potential of infertility treatments (which have drawn couples, but again specifically women, into years of heartbreak, extraordinary physical pain and unknowable risks, and financial distress). Or the opportunities made possible by interest-only mortgages. Or the rather more comical paralysis I've often felt, standing before 74 different cereal options in the supermarket aisle. And so on. Yet such increased "choices" are almost invariably viewed as freedom.

I would hasten to add, though, that it is not the expanded choices *per se* that are the problem, but the impulsiveness, or insufficient self-discipline, or absence of a clearly defined personal value system that provides a framework for response to the siren calls of choice. In short: the habits of self-control and judgment that Dewey says are so critical.

Kohli, “Education and Freedom in the American Experience”:

6. Note the challenge to the Enlightenment and the link between “critical reason” or “critical dialectical thought” and true freedom (as opposed to the ‘freedom’ of the individual to partake in a ‘free-market’ economy–i.e., the shop/drop syndrome mentioned above).

Mmm. I liked what was evidently said by Solomon, quoted by Greene, and requoted by Kohli that freedom is meant to be "freedom from both causal determination and from rational coercion" (p. 99). I'm heartened to hear that Greene "insists upon the agency of individuals" and the possibility for freedom through choices as one recognizes and confronts "the reality posed by external conditions" (p. 99). This speaks again to the habits of self-control and judgment that Dewey insists upon. I'm wary, though, of arguments that amount to various flavors of false consciousness.

7. How does Kohli describe Greene’s education for freedom (p. 100 and passim)?? I'll be darned if I can find the word "passim" on the page. Passion, maybe?

Anyway, what I understand Greene-via-Kohli to mean by "education for freedom" is one which facilitates students' own process towards "waking up," and transforming themselves to "repair lacks and take action to create themselves" (Greene p. 21 as quoted by Kohli p. 100) Perhaps ironically, or perhaps not, this language closely tracks that in the Jesuit framework we began the class with, which framed freedom in terms of self-recognition of our fundamentally sinful nature, and willingness to confront this through service to others. It is also, I think, not too far from my own formulation of freedom as rooted in competence, including the competence to make independent judgments and to reject societal norms or values if they are poorly aligned to personal ones.

8. “...[O]ne’s freedom is achieved, not received” (p. 102). What does Kohli mean by this? How is it achieved? What is the role of art in its achievement? Well, it's been a very long time since I tried to tackle Sartre, and I am uneasy with receiving Sartre via Greene via Kohli. That said, I *do* believe, as I wrote in Paper 1, that true freedom can only be earned, not granted. Institutions -- be they national governments, schools, or families -- can only protect the *parameters* of freedom: the right to participate in the selection of leaders, the right to speak freely, the right to move about physically, etc. It's up to individuals to *pick these rights up* and do something positive with them.

Greene-via-Kohli says that the first step towards doing so is to Wake Up: to "engage" with our particular "walls" (102) and thereafter to connect "in community, in dialogue" (103), which she sees as necessary to develop true self-awareness. Finally, she sees great potential in literature to plumb these depths.

9. It is worth discussing, a propos the role of dialogue and democracy in the classroom, structural challenges to this activity, specifically around gender (pp. 105-106). Sigh. OK. If we must.